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This paper provides a very simple experimental test of a prediction of Nash 
Bargaining Theory that seems counterintuitive. The context is a simple 
bargaining problem between two players who have to agree a choice from 
three alternatives. One alternative favors one player and a second favors the 
other. The third is a fair compromise, but is excluded as an agreed choice by 
Nash Bargaining Theory. Our experimental results show that agreement on 
this third outcome occurs rather often. So the Nash theory is not well-
supported by our evidence, although neither is a Strategic explanation of the 
data. The Nash-precluded outcome appeals because of its compromise nature; 
indeed, players are prepared to pay a price which is (according to the Nash 
theory) irrationally high, in order to reach a fair compromise. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THIS PAPER REPORTS on an experimental investigation based on the following decision 
problem. There is a single (desirable) prize that may be allocated to either of two individuals, 
J and K. The allocation is to be decided randomly, by drawing a colored ball from an opaque 
bag. The prize goes to J if the drawn ball is yellow, and to K if blue. If the drawn ball is red, 
however, then they each receive nothing. The problem for J and K is that they have to agree 
which one of three bags is to be used for the draw, with contents as shown in Table 1. 
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If they fail to agree then by default no draw occurs and they each receive nothing, an outcome 
we denote as z. 
  Assuming that they are both self-interested, J and K have opposing preferences, ex 
ante, over the three bags. Bag C, being the middle-ranked alternative for both partners, 
represents the compromise agreement. It is also uniquely fair, in the obvious sense that it 
gives J and K an equal chance of winning the prize. However this fair compromise comes at a 
price, in the form of the red ball. Five or more red balls in Bag C, yellows and blues being 
unchanged throughout, would be too high a price, in that both partners would be better off, ex 
ante, with either of Bags A and B. We can say that, in that case, agreement on Bag C would 
be collectively irrational for the two partners.
1 But what if, as here, Bag C contains only one 
red ball? Is this too high a price to pay for the fair compromise?  
  It would be so if J and K could instead privately, and bindingly, agree to toss a fair coin 
to decide between Bags A and B, since this would give them each, ex ante, a 50% chance of 
winning the prize. It would similarly be so if they could bindingly agree to share the prize 
afterwards, either by direct division or through side-payments and/or further randomization, 
since each of Bags A and B delivers with certainty the prize thereby to be shared. But 
suppose that neither type of agreement is possible, so that the only options for J and K are 
just as initially described. Might they then reasonably agree to choose the fair, but costly, 
compromise in the form of Bag C? Our conjecture was that reasonable people, including 
ourselves, probably would do so. However, the agreed choice of Bag C is precluded by Nash 
Bargaining Theory. 
  In the following section we demonstrate this proposition. In section 3 we describe an 
experiment based on this decision problem. The results are discussed in section 4. 
 
2. COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY IN THE COSTLY COMPROMISE PROBLEM  
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DEFINE a Costly Compromise Problem (CCP) where, for given parameters  1
2 π (, 1 ) ∈  and 
1
2 γ (1- , ) ∈π , and a given prospective prize P, individuals J and K have to agree a choice from 
three alternative “bags” (or any equivalent devices) as defined in Table 2. Thus, Table 1 
represents a CCP with  0.75 π=  and  0.4 γ= . Note that in general no assumption is made 
about the correlation between the two events [J wins] and [K wins]. Section 1 describes a 
CCP in which these events are mutually exclusive. But there could be a variation in which for 
each partner an independent draw (with replacement) is to be made from the agreed bag, with 
the attendant possibility of both partners winning P.  
 Define  ˆ (1- ) π= π π , where necessarily  1
2 ˆ (1- , ) π∈π  (in Table 1, for example, we have 
ˆ 0.43 π≈ ). Our counterintuitive result is the following: if  ˆ γ<π, as in Table 1, then Nash 
Bargaining Theory rules out Bag C as an agreed choice in the CCP.  
  We demonstrate this in two ways. The first, and simpler, is in terms of the Nash 
Product. In abstract, a two-person bargaining problem comprises a set of available 
alternatives X, each of which is weakly preferred by both bargaining partners to some given 
default outcome d. Nash’s axioms together require the existence of some  (0,1) ρ∈  such that 
the agreed choice  X x∈  maximizes the Nash Product: 
(1) 
1 N () [ () ] [ () ] jk xu x u x
ρ −ρ =  
where  () j ux and ( ) k ux are the two partners’ individual vNM utilities,
2 each normalized to 
zero at d. (The further inclusion of a “symmetry” axiom requires the agreed choice to 
maximize (1) specifically for  1
2 ρ= .) 
  The CCP is a two-person bargaining problem with dz =  and X={A,B,C}, taking as 
given the prospective prize P and the probability parameters {B,(}. Here vNM utilities may 
be normalized to: 
   () 0 j uz=    (A) j u =π   (B) 1- j u = π   (C) j u = γ    
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   () 0 k uz=    (A) 1- k u =π   (B) k u = π   (C) k u = γ    
so that, for any given D: 
(2) 
11 N(A) (1- ) N(B) (1- ) N(C)
ρ− ρ ρ − ρ =π π = π π =γ 
Evidently N(C) N(A) ≥   and N(C) N(B) ≥  together imply 
2 (1- ) γ≥ π π. Given  ˆ γ<π, 
therefore, there is no value of D for which Bag C maximizes the Nash Product. This 
completes the first demonstration. 
  Collective rationality, as characterized by the Nash axioms, is implicit in the 
maximization of (1).
3 The second demonstration makes this more explicit by appealing 
directly to Nash-type axioms. For any bargaining problem, given the partners and their 
individual preferences, define the eligible subset (X, ) X d Γ ⊆ . This is analogous to the set of 
most-preferred alternatives in the case of individual choice,
4 with the following three axioms 
thus being interpretable as requirements of rationality: 
Non-emptiness   (X, ) d Γ  is non-empty. 
Efficiency     (X, ) x d ∉Γ  if there exists some  X y∈  strictly preferred to x by each 
partner. 
Consistency   (X, ) x d ∉Γ  if there exists some  X y∈  and Y X ⊃  such that 
(Y, ) x d ∉Γ  and  (Y, ) yd ∈Γ . 
  Now consider a hypothetical variant on the CCP in which J and K have to agree not 
only a choice of bag but also, at the same time, a choice of prize from Q and R, over which 
they have opposing preferences. Specifically, given B we can hypothesize prizes Q and R 
such that: 
(3)  ˆˆ [Q, ] [R, ] [R, ] [Q, ] jk and π∼ π π∼ π 
where [P, ] ϕ  denotes the prospect of winning P with probability φ. If J and K each have 
preferences conforming to Expected Utility (EU) theory, then (3) implies additionally that:  
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(4)  ˆˆ [Q,1- ] [R, ] [R,1- ] [Q, ] jk and π∼ π π∼ π 
since the two probabilities in each prospect-pair have a common ratio throughout. 
  We are here considering, in effect, a two-person bargaining problem with dz =  and 
QQQRRR X={A ,B ,C ,A ,B ,C }, the subscripts indicating the variable prize. Now assume that 
ˆ γ<π, so that for both partners: 
(5)  ,, ˆˆ [Q, ] [Q, ] [R, ] [R, ] jk jk and πγ πγ ff  
 
It follows from (3), (4) and (5) that  Q C  and  R C  are both Pareto-dominated, the former by  R A 
and the latter by  Q B . Efficiency therefore requires that Bag C is ineligible here, whatever the 
agreed choice of prize, if  ˆ γ<π. 
  Next decompose this hypothetical problem into its two constituent CCPs. In each of 
these J and K have to agree a choice from {A,B,C} with the same {B,(} values as in the 
composite problem, but with the prize in each case being fixed, respectively, as Q and R. In 
the composite problem, given that  Q C  and  R C  are both ineligible, Non-emptiness requires 
that at least one of  QQRR {A ,B ,A ,B } is eligible. Consistency then implies that in the 
constituent problems either  QQ Q Q C{ A , B , C } ∉  or  RR R R C{ A , B , C } ∉ . In other words, if  ˆ γ<π, 
then C is ineligible in at least one of these constituent CCPs.         
  So for any {B,(} values such that  ˆ γ<π, there exists at least one, albeit hypothetical, 
CCP in which the agreed choice of Bag C is precluded by the above three axioms of 
collective rationality. Now add a fourth, more context-specific, axiom: 
Prize-Independence   In any CCP, the eligibility of each bag depends only on the values of 
{B,(} 
Then it follows that Bag C is ineligible in any (hypothetical or actual) CCP with  ˆ γ<π, 
irrespective of the prize at stake. This completes the second demonstration.    
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  In the next section we describe an experiment designed to test this specific implication 
of the Nash theory, i.e., that Bag C cannot be the agreed choice in a CCP if  ˆ γ<π. As is 
evident from the axiomatic argument, in effect this is a joint test of a number of assumptions. 
It may be thought that such an exercise is superfluous, given the prior existence of adverse 
experimental evidence on some of these assumptions individually. Most obviously, the 
assumption of EU preferences, by which we derived (4) from (3), is contradicted by a long 
record of experimental findings.
5 However, for our purposes this assumption is unnecessarily 
strong. The axiomatic argument would still go through if (4) was weakened to: 
   ˆ [Q,1- ] [R, ] j ππ \     and        ˆ [R,1- ] [Q, ] k π π \  
which, in conjunction with (3), would be consistent not only with EU but also with the 
common-ratio violation of EU, regularly observed under experimental conditions, whereby 
an individual’s preference for the riskier prospect (i.e., that with the preferred prize but lower 
probability of winning) over the safer is inversely related to the overall probability levels. 
  Similarly, consider the axiom of Prize-Independence. This is implied by the Nash 
theory, as is evident in the Nash Products given in (2) which, like the vNM utility values on 
which they are based, are independent of the prize at stake. Indeed, these utility values would 
be the same even if there were different prizes in prospect for each partner. Thus in our 
definition of a CCP we can allow the more general possibility that  JK P=[P ,P ] is a vector of 
prizes, with  J P  awarded to J in the event that J wins, and likewise  K P  to K. Both 
demonstrations of the ineligibility of Bag C, given  ˆ γ<π, go through without amendment. 
However, there is prior evidence to suggest that Prize-Independence would be violated, 
empirically, for some CCPs of this type. In a series of experiments by Roth and various 
associates,
6 a monetary prize was allocated by lottery to one of two partners, who had to 
agree in advance how to divide a given total of lottery tickets between themselves. In 
treatments where it was common knowledge that the partners faced different prizes,  
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compensating unequal divisions of tickets were regularly agreed, with the effect of equalizing 
expected monetary values. Equivalent behavior in a CCP would be for J and K to agree a 
choice of Bag A given common knowledge of P[ £ , £( 1 ) ] xx = π− π , but Bag B given 
P[ £( 1 ) , £ ] x x =− π π , each partner having an expected return of £x throughout. The 
behavior of Roth’s subjects could be interpreted in terms of fairness or of focal points. Either 
way, it casts doubt on the predictive power of the Nash theory, and in particular Prize-
Independence. 
  To avoid our axiomatic argument, and thus our experiment, being vitiated by Roth’s 
findings, we can simply restrict our definition of a CCP. One possibility is to require, for a 
CCP, that if  JK PP ≠  then the prizes are not common knowledge. Another is to require 
(common knowledge) that  JK P=[P ,P ] is envy-free, i.e., that neither partner strictly prefers the 
other’s prize to their own. The form of CCP used in our experiment could be interpreted as 
satisfying either of these conditions.  
  In summary, the proposition that  ˆ γ<π makes Bag C ineligible in the CCP follows 
from a relatively weak version of Nash Bargaining Theory, the testing of which does not 
appear to have been pre-empted by already existing empirical evidence. 
 
3. THE EXPERIMENT 
IN DESIGNING THE EXPERIMENT a central concern was to prevent collusive agreements 
of the type described in Section 1. Thus our subjects had to negotiate anonymously and via 
computer, and with minimal exploitable information about the value of the prize in prospect, 
which could differ between partners.  
  The experiment was conducted in the EXEC laboratory at the University of York, the 
subjects being undergraduate and postgraduate students. There were four experimental 
treatments, as described below. For each treatment there were two separate sessions, each  
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lasting around 45 minutes and employing a group of sixteen new subjects seated at individual 
computer terminals. Apart from oral instructions, pre-recorded and played back to the whole 
group, the session was carried out in silence with subjects communicating only with or via 
the computer. The principal off-screen instructions are presented in Appendix A, and can 
usefully be read now. 
  In the main part (“Part 2”) of the experiment the sixteen subjects were randomly and 
anonymously paired. Each partnership had to agree a choice of bag. This process was 
repeated in each of three further rounds, with re-matching of partners in such a way as to 
avoid cross-contamination by previous matches. In each round, the two partners negotiated 
within a structured protocol of alternating offers. The partner randomly designated as J (i.e., 
Yellow) opened by proposing one of the three bags, optionally accompanying the proposal 
with a brief message. K could either accept this proposal, thus ending the negotiations with 
agreement, or reject it. Rejection would trigger a computerized randomizer to determine 
whether the process would end at that stage in disagreement or could continue, with K 
making a counterproposal. Negotiations continued in this way until either a proposal was 
accepted, or the randomizer ended the process in disagreement. Appendix B shows a 
representative screenshot, in this case for a proposer about to compose a message to 
accompany the proposal of Bag A. The randomizer took the form of an onscreen spinning 
wheel, visible simultaneously to both partners, containing two sectors: green for continuation 
and red for termination. At the outset of Part 2, prior to being paired-up for the first round, 
individual subjects were given dummy screens so that they could practice making proposals 
and responses. In particular they were invited to spin the wheel as many times as they 
wanted, the aim being to give them confidence that it was genuine (which it was). 
  The probability of continuation, after any rejection, had to be low enough to keep 
negotiations to a manageable length, while high enough to permit agreement on any of the  
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three bags as a strategic equilibrium, and therefore to provide a test of the Axiomatic theory. 
A sufficiently low continuation probability 2 produces, in effect, an Ultimatum Game. 
Assuming common-knowledge of (self-interested) rationality, the unique equilibrium here 
has J proposing, and K accepting, Bag A at the outset.
7 Specifically, if 1−π>θπ then K 
accepts this proposal, since the best that K could achieve otherwise is J’s acceptance of Bag 
B at the next stage, which occurs only with probability 2.  
  By contrast, a sufficiently high value of 2 produces a negotiation game with multiple 
equilibria. Suppose that K’s strategy is always to propose, and to accept only, Bag B. Then 
clearly J can do no better than likewise to propose or accept B at any stage. In turn, K’s 
strategy of accepting only B, and thus in particular of rejecting C, is rational if γ<θ π. So 
given this condition there is an equilibrium in which Bag B is the agreed choice irrespective 
of who makes the first proposal. But, by symmetric reasoning, this same condition implies a 
second equilibrium in which both partners always propose/accept Bag A. Strategically this 
resembles a one-off Chicken Game, having one equilibrium in which J defers to K, and 
another in which K defers to J. With a sufficiently high 2 there is also an equilibrium in 
which Bag C is the agreed choice irrespective of who makes the first proposal. Suppose that 
K’s strategy is always to propose or accept C and to reject A. Given this, it is rational for J 
likewise always to propose or accept C. It is additionally rational for J always to reject B if 
1-π<θ γ. The two strategies here are symmetric, so this same condition rationalizes K’s 
strategy, given J’s. Overall, therefore, if  max[ ,(1 ) ] θ >γ π − π γ  then there exist equilibria 
supporting agreement on each of the three bags, and in each case irrespective of who makes 
the first proposal.
8 
  These considerations suggested to us a 2×2 structure of experimental treatments, 
providing a comparison of the Axiomatic and Strategic theories in a unified setting. Table 3 
defines these four treatments parametrically, and in each case indicates the  
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permitted/predicted agreements according to the two theories.  
  In implementing these treatments we used bags in which the number of yellow and blue 
balls was double that shown in Table 1. Thus, as in Table 1, each treatment had  0.75 π=  and 
ˆ 0.43 π≈ . This doubling made possible Treatments 1 and 3, for which there was just one red 
ball in Bag C, corresponding to  0.44 γ≈ . For Treatments 2 and 4 there were two red balls, 
thus corresponding to  0.4 γ=  just as in Table 1. The continuation probabilities were  0.85 θ=  
for Treatments 1 and 2, and  0.15 θ=  for Treatments 3 and 4, these values being comfortably 
within the required constraints indicated in Table 3. 
 To  inhibit  ex post sharing agreements, negotiation over the agreed choice of bag was 
carried out with both partners unaware not only of each others’ prospective prize but also of 
their own. We also wanted to make it difficult for partners to estimate expected values for 
these prizes, including from any prior communication with subjects from previous sessions. 
To this end we preceded the main part of the experiment with an individual decision problem 
(“Part 1”) in which each of the sixteen subjects privately nominated one of seven virtual 
boxes, labeled A-G. Each box contained £30 to be divided equally between all those subjects 
nominating it. The subject’s individual dividend from this process then became his (or her) 
prospective monetary prize in Part 2. There were two practice rounds, after each of which the 
distribution of nominations across the seven boxes was displayed on all screens, with the 
corresponding hypothetical dividend being shown individually and privately for each subject. 
The third round of nominations was for real. Each subject could of course infer his own 
dividend from the distribution of nominations in this round, and that information was indeed 
disclosed, simultaneously to all subjects, but not until the end of Part 2 when the negotiations 
had all been completed. After this, each subject was called separately, in turn, into the 
adjacent office, where he first drew a numbered ball from a bag to determine which of the 
four rounds in Part 2 was actually to count and be played out for real. If the indicated round  
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was one in which he had failed to reach agreement with his partner, then he left with nothing. 
Otherwise he next drew a ball from the bag he had agreed in that round. If this ball matched 
his designated color in that round, then he was paid his dividend, the value of which was 
known only to himself and the experimenter; otherwise he left with nothing.  
 
4. THE RESULTS 
FOR EACH of the four treatments there were 64 CCPs (two sessions, each comprising four 
rounds re-matching eight pairs of subjects). The outcome of each CCP was either agreement 
on one of the bags {A,B,C} or else disagreement (z). Figure 1 charts, for each treatment, the 
frequency of each outcome, aggregating over rounds and sessions.
9 Figure 1 should be read in 
conjunction with Table 3, from which we see that the principal test of the Axiomatic theory is 
its implication of no C-agreements in Treatment 2. The theory clearly fails this test. 
Similarly, the principal test of the Strategic theory is its implication of no C-agreements 
(indeed only A-agreements) in Treatment 3, on which it similarly fails. Each of these theories 
implies no C-agreements also in Treatment 4, on which basis again each fails. These are 
stringent tests, of course. From the results in Figure 1 we can infer that not all subjects 
conform to the Axiomatic theory, and likewise that not all subjects conform to the Strategic 
theory. But perhaps some subjects do, in each case. So a less stringent test would involve 
comparing the relative frequencies of agreements across relevant treatments.  
  Thus, while the Strategic theory does not predict any change in behavior in moving 
from Treatment 1 to 2, or from Treatment 3 to 4, if there are any subjects who conform to the 
Axiomatic theory then we should expect fewer C-agreements in Treatments 2 and 4 than in 
Treatments 1 and 3 respectively. Figure 1 shows that the data is ambivalent here - there being 
indeed fewer C-agreements in Treatment 4 than in 3, but more in Treatment 2 than in 1. 
Similarly, while the Axiomatic theory does not predict any change in behavior in moving  
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from Treatment 1 to Treatment 3, or from Treatment 2 to Treatment 4, if there are any 
subjects who conform to the Strategic theory then we should expect more A-agreements in 
Treatments 3 and 4 than in Treatments 1 and 2 respectively. In this sense the data appears to 
give some support to the Strategic theory - at least at this level of aggregation. Let us now 
look at some detail. 
  According to the Axiomatic theory, there should have been no C-agreements at all in 
Treatment 2. In fact there were more than in Treatment 1, and proportionately more of these 
(63% compared with 50%) were reached immediately, on the opening proposal. Table 4 
shows, by each of the four rounds and in total, the opening proposals and responses in each 
CCP. After just one proposal there had been 29 C-agreements in Treatment 2, compared with 
21 in Treatment 1. This reflects both a greater incidence of C-proposals (50% compared with 
41%), and a higher acceptance rate (91% compared with 81%), although on a chi-squared test 
neither of these differences is statistically significant ( 0.287 p =  and  0.279 p =  
respectively). Figure 2 charts the number of C-agreements reached on or before the nth 
proposal in each treatment. The longest such negotiation was in Treatment 1, with agreement 
reached on the eighth proposal.  
  At the individual level there is similarly little evidence in support of the Axiomatic 
theory. Every one of the 32 individual subjects in Treatment 2 was party to at least one C-
agreement over the four rounds. Furthermore there were very few messages, at any stage, 
expressing aversion to Bag C. Of the 57 proposals for Bag A or B throughout Treatment 2, 44 
were accompanied by messages of some type. Only five of these clearly referred directly or 
indirectly to the red balls in Bag C. These five messages came from three different subjects, 
all in Session 2. One was Subject 5, whose brief negotiation with Subject 15 ran as follows. 
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Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 8
5  A  no reds which are a waste for us 
 
 15 C  we wont agree on the other 2 – 
reds are a fair price to pay for 
equality ! 
5  accept C       
 
In this respect there was little difference between the two treatments. Throughout Treatment 1 
there were 79 proposals for Bag A or B; 66 of these were accompanied by messages of some 
type and, of these, six expressed aversion to Bag C.  
  So the results from Treatment 2 offer little support for the Axiomatic theory. Similarly, 
those from Treatments 3 and 4 appear to disconfirm the Strategic theory, according to which 
there should have been no C-agreements in either treatment. However, as noted above in 
Section 3, this assumes common knowledge of rationality. A strategically rational (SR) 
player will: (SR1) accept whatever is proposed, and (SR2) propose the best for him that his 
partner will accept. If he knows his partner to be rational, and therefore following SR1, then 
SR2 prescribes proposing his most-preferred bag. But if instead he believes that his partner 
would irrationally reject this, then proposing it would not be rational. So any number of C-
agreements, or even B-agreements, in Treatment 3 would be consistent with all individual 
subjects being SR, but with some of them being sufficiently doubtful of this fact. 
  Nevertheless, a sure indicator that not all subjects were SR is the occurrence of 
disagreement, i.e., termination after rejection, comprising 25% of all outcomes in Treatment 
3, and 20% in Treatment 4. Indeed, an upper bound to the number of SR subjects in each 
treatment is given by the number who (in conformity with SR1) did not reject any proposal 
throughout the four rounds. On this basis there were at most 16 SR subjects (out of 32) in 
Treatment 3, and 20 in Treatment 4. 
  So the Strategic theory fails the strong test, the data revealing that not all subjects were 
strategically rational. There is some support for the theory on the weaker test, however, in 
that there were rather more A-agreements in Treatments 3 and 4 than in Treatments 1 and 2  
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respectively. On a chi-squared test we can reject the hypothesis that the proportion of A-
agreements to all outcomes is the same in Treatments 1 and 3 ( 0.013) p = , and likewise in 
Treatments 2 and 4 ( 0.001) p < . This suggests the presence of at least some SR subjects. 
  The question then arises as to what coherent strategies, if any, were being followed by 
the other subjects and, relatedly, how to account for the different pattern of outcomes 
between Treatments 3 and 4, as indicated by Figure 1. A chi-squared test rejects ( 0.040) p =  
the hypothesis that the overall (four-outcome) frequencies are drawn from the same 
population, and likewise ( 0.005) p =  the proportion of C-agreements to all agreements. Table 
4 suggests that the explanation for this difference lies mainly in the proposals rather than the 
responses. There is no significant difference ( 0.387) p =  in the proportion of opening C-
proposals accepted (89% in Treatment 3 and 95% in Treatment 4). The proportion of opening 
A-proposals accepted is higher in Treatment 4 (66% compared with 46%), but this difference 
is not clearly significant ( 0.127) p = . The ratio of A-proposals to C-proposals is, however, 
substantially and significantly ( 0.034) p =  higher in Treatment 4. Given that proportionately 
more A-proposals were accepted overall in Treatment 4 than in Treatment 3, it could be that 
experience of this over the course of the four rounds led SR subjects to propose Bag A more 
frequently. However, as Table 4 also reveals, if anything the trend was in the opposite 
direction; the greater propensity towards A-proposals in Treatment 4 is especially evident at 
the outset, in Round 1. 
  It may have simply been that SR subjects in Treatment 4 were more optimistic that their 
A-proposals would be accepted than were their counterparts in Treatment 3. However, as 
noted above, many subjects revealed themselves to be irrational by rejecting one or more 
proposals over the four rounds. So an alternative explanation might be there were other 
irrational, but coherent, strategies being followed, and by different numbers of subjects in 
each of the two treatments. One possibility is a Fair strategy (F), which prescribes never  
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rejecting Bag C or proposing Bag A or B. This is an incomplete characterization, and 
compatible with the minimum criterion (no rejections) for rationality; a stronger version (F+) 
additionally prescribes never accepting the least-preferred bag. Another possibility, especially 
in Treatment 4, is a Non-C strategy (NC), which prescribes never proposing Bag C, and its 
correspondingly stronger version (NC+) which additionally prescribes never accepting Bag 
C. Table 5 records, for each of these strategies, the number of subjects whose proposals and 
responses, through all four rounds, were consistent with the respective criteria. This gives an 
upper bound to the number of subjects following that strategy. Some subjects satisfied the 
criteria for several of these strategies; others did so for none. The table also records the 
number of subjects who satisfied the weaker criteria for only one of these three strategies. 
  The number of subjects possibly NC in Treatment 4 is almost twice that in Treatment 3. 
But only three of these could only have been NC, and at most five of them could have been 
following the stronger NC+ strategy. So it is not clear that the extra red ball in Bag C is a 
coherent influence in Treatment 4. This conclusion is supported by the transcripts. Of the 37 
messages accompanying proposals of Bag A or B, none referred to the red balls in Bag C or 
to the absence of them in Bags A or B.  
  Table 5 also shows the results of applying the same criteria to Treatments 1 and 2. 
Given the high continuation probability, strategic rationality has no clear unconditional 
prescriptions here, so no subject can be ruled out as being SR. Thus our interest is in the 
number of subjects possibly F or NC, defined as those whose behavior is consistent 
throughout the whole session with the respective criteria for these strategies. The number of 
subjects possibly F is similar across all four treatments. In Treatments 1 and 2 each these 
subjects is also possibly F+, presumably reflecting the lower cost here of rejecting a proposal. 
Interestingly, the number of subjects possibly NC is at its lowest in Treatment 2. 
Furthermore, none of these could also have been NC+. Indeed, as already noted above, every  
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subject in Treatment 2 was party to at least one C-agreement. 
  In summary, therefore, both the Axiomatic and the Strategic theories are rejected on a 
strong test, respectively by virtue of the C-agreements in Treatment 2 and the disagreements 
in Treatments 3 and 4. The Strategic theory finds some weak support in the greater number of 
A-agreements in Treatments 2 and 4 compared with Treatments 1 and 3 respectively. Even 
on a weaker test of this type, however, the Axiomatic theory finds no support. The number of 
C-agreements is actually higher in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. It is lower in Treatment 
4 than in Treatment 3, but closer inspection reveals no clear indication that this is due to the 
extra red ball in Bag C.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
NASH BARGAINING THEORY rests on axioms of collective rationality. We investigated 
an implication of the theory that seems to be strongly counterintuitive, that is, that bargaining 
partners should agree to reject what appears to be a reasonable and fair compromise. We put 
this implication to the test in an experiment which also exposed the Strategic theory of 
bargaining to a parallel test. We find that neither theory gets much support from the evidence. 
It seems that individuals are more attracted by the appeal of a fair compromise than is 
allowed either by the Nash theory or, for that matter, the Strategic theory.  
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THE THREE BAGS 
   Bag A  Bag B  Bag C 
yellow  balls  3 1 2 
blue  balls 1 3 2 






THE GENERAL COSTLY COMPROMISE PROBLEM 
  Bag A  Bag B  Bag C 
Prob[J wins]  B 1-B  ( 





THE VARIOUS TREATMENTS IN THE EXPERIMENT 








Axiomatic: any bag 
 




Axiomatic: not Bag C 
 








Axiomatic: any bag 
 




Axiomatic: not Bag C 
 










OPENING PROPOSALS AND RESPONSES BY TREATMENT AND ROUND 
   Treatment  1 Treatment  2 
    A B C A B C 
proposed  10  0 6 5 2 9  R1 
accepted  1 0 6 1 2 8 
proposed  8  0  8 11 0  5  R2 
accepted  1 0 5 0 0 5 
proposed  9 1 6 6 1 9  R3 
accepted  0 1 6 0 1 8 
proposed  10  0 6 6 1 9  R4 
accepted  1 0 4 1 1 8 
proposed  37 1 26  28 4 32  all 
accepted  3 1  21  2 4  29 
 
   Treatment  3 Treatment  4 
    A B C A B C 
proposed  5 1  10  11  2 3  R1 
accepted  3 1 9 6 2 3 
proposed  6  1  9 10 1  5  R2 
accepted  3 1 8 7 0 5 
proposed  6 0  10  8 2 6  R3 
accepted  2 - 9 4 2 5 
proposed  9 0 7 6 2 8  R4 
accepted  4 - 6 6 2 8 
proposed  26 2 36  35 7 22  all 




POSSIBLE STRATEGY TYPES (OUT OF 32 SUBJECTS IN EACH TREATMENT) 
 
  consistent with  consistent only with 
  RS F F+  NC  NC+  none  RS F NC 
Treatment  1  32  8 8 8 1 0  16  0 0 
Treatment  2  32  9 9 4 0 0  18  0 0 
Treatment  3  16  11  9  10  3 5 7 7 3 

























































NUMBER OF C-AGREEEMENTS REACHED ON OR BEFORE THE n




































Initial (pre-recorded) oral instructions prior to Part 1 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. We hope that you will enjoy it. If you have a 
mobile phone with you, please check now that it is switched off. [pause] 
The experiment requires you to make a few simple decisions which, together with a random 
factor, will determine the amount you are paid at the end of the session.  
There are sixteen participants in this session, all facing the same decisions and receiving the 
same instructions. Beside your terminal you have an envelope, some blank paper, and a pen. 
Please do not open the envelope until instructed to do so. The pen and paper are provided 
should you wish to keep a record of your decisions, although it is not necessary to do this. 
Please leave the pen here at the end of the session. 
The session is in two parts. Decisions in Part 1 will determine an amount of money which we 
will call your dividend. This amount may vary from one individual to another. 
However, whether or not you receive your dividend will depend on Part 2, where you will 
have to agree some decisions with other participants. We will give you further details on this 
at the start of Part 2. 
You will receive instructions both orally, like this, and also on the computer screen. In 
addition, at all times there will be an information bar at the bottom of the screen. This will 
remind you what action needs to be taken at that time. 
You will have opportunities to ask questions should the instructions not be clear to you. 
Otherwise, however, you must remain silent throughout the session. At various times you 
may have to wait for other participants to complete their decisions. If so, please be patient. 
Before we proceed to Part 1, are there any questions?  [pause]    
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Please click the Start button now. Read the onscreen information and then wait for further 
instructions.  [pause] 
Your task in Part 1 is simply to choose one of the seven boxes. Each box contains £30, to be 
shared equally among the participants choosing that box. There will be three rounds. The first 
two are for practice only, and will not count. But the third round is for real, and will 
determine your dividend. 
There will be no further oral instructions until Part 1 is completed. Are there any questions?  
[pause] 
Please make your first practice selection now and then follow onscreen instructions until Part 
1 is complete.  
28
(Pre-recorded) oral instructions prior to Part 2 
Part 1 is now complete. Your dividend has been computed, but will not be revealed to you 
until the end of the session. 
We will now proceed to Part 2, which consists of four rounds. In each round the computer 
will pair you, at random, with another participant. It will designate one of you as Yellow and 
the other as Blue. The pair of you have to agree a decision, which will be explained shortly. 
You will then be assigned a new partner for the next round, and so on. 
Thus, after four rounds, you will have agreed four decisions, each with a different partner. 
However, only one of these four agreements will actually count for you. 
At the end of the session, each participant will be paid individually in private, in the adjoining 
office. So no other participant will know what payment you receive, unless you yourself 
choose to reveal it to them afterwards.  
Your payment will be determined as follows. Firstly you will draw a number from 1 to 4, 
from this bag. This will select which of the four rounds in Part 2 is to count for you. Your 
color, either Yellow or Blue, will be as designated in your selected round. Then you will 
draw a ball from this bag, which will contain some yellow and blue balls, and possibly some 
red balls. If you draw your designated color, then you will be paid your dividend. Otherwise 
you will be paid nothing. 
We have not yet told you how many balls of each color will be in your bag. In fact, this is the 
decision you have to agree with your partner. The contents of your bag will be as agreed by 
you and your partner in your selected round. 
The envelope contains a summary of the information so far. Please open it now and read the 
summary. [pause]  
You may consult the summary again at any time during Part 2.  
In each round you will communicate with your partner only via the computer. Instructions for  
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doing this will appear on your screen. Are there any questions? [pause] 
Please click the Continue button now. The next few screens give you further details on Part 2, 
and enable you to practice communicating with your partner. Please note that for the purpose 
of these practice screens you will be communicating with yourself, as if you were your own 
partner. 
Please read and follow the instructions, continuing through the practice screens in your own 
time. [pause] 
Are there any questions? [pause] 
Then please begin Part 2 now. 
 
Written summary information, provided prior to Part 2 
Part 1 
Your dividend is determined. It will be revealed to you after Part 2. 
Part 2 
  Round 1   The computer randomly assigns you a partner, and designates one of 
you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner agree the 
contents of the bag. 
  Round 2   The computer randomly assigns you a new partner, and designates 
one of you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner 
agree the contents of the bag. 
  Round 3   The computer randomly assigns you a new partner, and designates 
one of you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner 
agree the contents of the bag. 
  Round 4   The computer randomly assigns you a new partner, and designates 
one of you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner  
30
agree the contents of the bag. 
Payment 
You are paid individually and privately in the office, as follows.... 
You select one round (1-4) at random. Your color (Yellow or Blue) is as designated in that 
round, and the contents of your bag are as agreed with your partner in that round. 
You draw a ball from your bag. If it is your designated color, then you are paid your 
dividend. Otherwise you are paid nothing.  
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APPENDIX B 





Treatment 1  0.85 4 9 θ= γ=  
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
12  C  Any other suggestions?    14  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 
2  A  is it ok?    9  C Let's coordinate so at least we play. 
 
2  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
2  A   
 
 9  C
 
2  reject C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
5  C  lets play safe    6  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
11  C  it's the only fair option.    16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
15  A  What do you think?    7  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
3  C  50/50   10  accept C 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 
1  A  Yes?   8  C it's fairer for both, isn't it? 
 




Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
9  A  Is this ok ? 
 
 14  B any other suggestions? 
9  A  You may risk sometimes... don't you? 
 
 14  B As you said, you may risk...... 
9  C  Is this the only bag you like bag b? 
 





Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
2  A  Bag C is penalized, when you are yellow 
choose bag A and luck! 
 12  reject A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
13  A   
 
 5  C  
13  A     5  B B OR NOTHING. 
 
13  A     5  B B OR NOTHING. 
 
13  A     5  reject A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
6  A  i think that you may have at least  once the 
ideal bag, you should take  this choice 
when you're yellow! 
 4  accept A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
11  C  the only fair bag.    7  accept C 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
16  A  Cbag c= red ball, no payoff for both!!    5  reject A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
8  C  yes?   10  B grrrrrrrrrrrrrrr 
 
8  A  what now?    10  B ha! 
 
8  A  do you agree?    10  B no 
 
8  A  neither do i with your choice    10  C ok? 
 
8  accept C      
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 
3  C  50/50   1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
13  A     14  B hi, agree with me!!! 
 
13  A  hi, i think A should be agreed    14  B Hi, do you want to waist our time? 
 
13  accept B        
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
4  A   
 
 12  B  
4  C  if we agree on bag c than we have  the 
same probability to win. however, we can 
be unlucky if we choose draw re 
 12  accept C  
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Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
5  C  lets play safe    9  accept C 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
2  A  Bag C has a probability lowerthan 50% for 
both. it is better to agree with  bag A at 
each round. Thus probabilkiti es are 
maximized 
 
 6  B i'm ok with your theorie but i'm blue  and i 
was twice before.You may have at least 
the best chance once! 
2  A  I am sorry but I have already accept this 
theory being blue. I won't accept other 
solution than A 
 
 6  C lets play equal or nothing!!! 
2  accept C        
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
10  A  one of us will win.    11  C don't be selfish. C is fair 
 
10  accept C        
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
16  C  Just click accept!!    3  accept C 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
7  B  B????   8  accept B 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 
15  A  lets not risk another termination    1  C I believe this works for both of us. 
 
15  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
11  C  clearly the only fair choice    14  B I agree. However.... 
 
11  C  eat my shorts, you fiend    14  B You really want to disagree? We can 
share the divident! 
 
11  C  i'm stubborn. You'l lose it all for us    14  reject C 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
16  C  I am being friendly!!    12  accept C 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
7  A  A ??    9  B Never A.  Maybe, you are more lucky 
than me.. 
7  C  C is fair for both!!    9  B WE may draw the red from C!!! are you 
aware of this? 
7  accept B        
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Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
15  A  How about it?    12  reject A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
10  A  c is boring    13  accept A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
4  A  i think the aim of the game is the agr when 
we are paid our payment is based  take in 
your mind an ideal bag by the 
 
 3  B Why then should I give you bag a? 
4  accept B        
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
8  A  i've lost in all the previous section    5  reject A 
 
Treatment 1 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 
1    At least one of us will get it?    6    yes sure!! i would like it will be my  turn. I 
was blue twice before, so please!!!!!!! let 
me have the ideal  bag once!!!!! 
 
1    Have never had my ideal choice, it is  only 
fair to be unbias, correct? 
 6  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
16  C  fifty fifty chance, at least both of u s can get 
at least after divedend,do y ou agree 
 7  accept C 
 
 




5  C  this is the fairest for both of us, giving us an 
equal chance of success 
 11  accept C 
 
 




12  A  more yellows    13  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
4  A  Do you agree to Bag A?    15  C bag c is nash.  I'm never going to  aggree 
to a and your never going to  agree to b 
 
4  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
2  A  we can share the benefit,right?    1  C How would benifit be shared? I don't k 
now who u r, or how much u would b get 
ting. This gives same chance 4 both. 
 




Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
3  A  What do you think of this? 
 
 8  B This is the one I want 
3  accept B        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
10  A   
 
 9  C  
10  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 
6  A  Let me know your choice    14  C bag c - same chance of getting the money 
 








Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
11  C  This is fair for both of us, we  have equal 
chance of winning 
 16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
5  C  This is the fairest for both of us, giving us 
an equal chance. 
 7  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
13  A  more yellow    15  C yellow's not my colour! C is Nash-I.m  
never going to agree to A and your never 
going to agree to B 
 
13  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
12  A  if u let me have this bag u can have b ag b 
on the next round 
 4  C I guess this is the one that both of  us will 
agree on.. 
 
12  A  the red ball is a termination ball th ats why i 
think we should go for bag a now and bag 
b on the next round otherw wise we dont 
get anything 
 
 4  C It's either b or c, there's no way I'll agree 
to A.. 
12  A  look we do bag b in the next round bag c is 
a no go -we both get nothing -bag a now 
then u have ur equal chance in  the next 
round otherwise we 







Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
1  C  This gives an equal chance 2 both part ies. 
 
 8  B This is the one I want 
1  C  We both need 2 agree 2 continue or ris k 
losing all. Bag C gives both an equa l 
chance of sucess. 
 
 8  B sorry 
1  C  sorry! Stop trying 2 force me 2 chose  an 
inferior postion. I will not back d own. We 
have 2 agree or could lose. 
 8  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
2  C  It's equal chance.    3  B I'd prefer Bag B. I really like blue,  don't 
you? 
 
2  accept B        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
6  A  Can you do me a favor to let me choose a?    10  B Let me choose B - we can't afford to spin 
too many times 
 
6  accept B        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 
14  C  we've the same chance of getting the 
money 






Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
3  C  I am yellow    16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
12  A  well done uv cost us 2 rounds so now i 
suggest we do a and on the next round  b  
which is completely fair,and at lea st we get 
a chance of winnin 
 7  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
11  C  This is fair for both of us    15  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
5  C  Hi i'm Pete.  I suggest Bag C as it gives us 
an equal chance of winning. 







Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
10  A  May as well accept it - the spinning wheel 
is dangerous 
 1  C stop been silly. We both need 2 agree. 
That is only possilbe if C is chosen.  Dont 
put extra risk in by rejection. 
 
10  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
9  C  fair deal for both so we can gat an  
agreement without risk of losing the  deal? 
 2  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
6  A  I have got the other 2 choice in last  two 
times. I just want one high rate  round. Do 
me a favour! Thanks! 
 
 8  B sorry, same here.  Not backing down. 
6  accept B        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 
3  A  I love yellow. What do you think? 
 
 14  C well i like blue & red! 






Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
1  C  this gives the best chance 4 success 2 
both parties and the only one we will  both 
agree on. Dont risk refusal! 
 16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
2  A  I'm sorry to choose what I like.    7  C I would like 2 choose Bag B, but we wo 
uld never agree, so I think we should  just 
both have equal chance. 
 
2  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
8  A  This is the one I want    11  C This is the fairest. If you decline  this we 
spin the wheel and could both  lose. 
 
8  A  Sorry, but I'm not backing down    11  C well if you don't back down you will  
certainly win nothing if you pick 4  out the 
bag. At least this way you  have a 4/9 
chance. 
 
8  A     11  C I think it is better for both of us to have a 
chance of winning if we pick 4  than 
neither of us 
 




Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
5  C  Why am i always yellow?  Right i'm  going 
to be boring again and suggest bag C as 
it's fairest for both of us,  blah, blah 
 
 3  B Normally I'd agree with you, but  I'm 
allergic to red balls. Sorry! 
5  C  I'm not going to let you choose bag B as it 
is patently unfair.  We can  carry on 
rejecting each other and  lose if you want. 




Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
10  A  Lets not risk the bag on the last go 
 
 13  B I am blue 
10  reject B        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
12  C  r u completely crAZY OK WE DO C 
_NOTHI NG TO LOOSE NOW THANKS A 
BUNCH 
 9  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
6  A  Last time. I have to choose this. I  just want 
one high rate. Thank you!! 
 15  C I'm never choosing A, your never  
choosing B.  Your chances of winning 
reduce drastically if we cannot agree. 
 
6  A  I am sorry, I have got a choice of c.  That is 
meanless to me. If you have  got a high 
rate in last rounds. I  think choose a will no 
harm 
 
 15  B
 
6  A  It seems you don't get a high rate  in last 
round. Then  perhaps we finish in c?? 
 
 15  C cheap trick. 
6  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 1 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 
14  C  all the colours together!    4  accept C 
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Treatment 2  0.85 4 10 θ= γ=  
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
11  C  OK?   10  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 
13  A  4 yellow, 4 blue?    9  reject  A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
12  C  seems the fairest.    1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
15  A  is that alright?    7  B  
 
15  A     7  B  
 
15  C     7  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
3  C     14  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
2  C  Bag C will give us the same payoff...    5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
16  C  bag c, go on    4  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 










Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
10  A  is this ok?    13  C A/B wont be ok for either of us 
 
10  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 




Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
15  A   
 
 12  B  
15  A  let's see man ) 
 
 12  C compromise?? 
15  accept C        
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
7  A     1  C ive got more chance of winning but to 
 
7  A   
 
 1  C  
7  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
5  C  Equal chance of payoff... down with 
capitalism! 
 14  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
2  C  Bag C will give us the same payoff    3  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
8  C     16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
10  A  how's this? 
 
 12  B no way am I going for bag A! 
10  C  this will be the best for both of us, agreed?    12  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
1  A  sorry, but its a big advantage for me    11  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
13  A  Its only a game!! 
 
 15  B No it's war!!! 
13  C  We could all use the money 
 
 15  B see i'm really broke 
13  C  Not accepting B. Its C or we terminate 
 
 15  B money isn't everything! 
13  C  Give yourself a chance to win    15  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 




Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
14  B  Down with stinky self-interest Down with 
Psychology EXEC treasurers! Have 
yourself some cash, friend I choose Bag 
B!!! 
 16  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
3  C     4  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
5  C  I'm not a greedy person. I have lots o f 
money, so I think it's OK to share. 
 8  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 
2  C  Let's choose C - gives us equal payoff    6  accept C 




Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
14  B  Down with stinky self-interest! Down with 
Psychology EXEC treasurers! Have 
yourself some money friend! I choose Bag 
B!!! 
 10  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
3  A     11  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
5  C  I don't like red balls, but we have no choice 
to be fair! 
 13  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
9  C  same chance for both of us?    2  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
16  C     12  B your generocity could work in your fav 
or... 
 
16  C  you cannot spell generosity!!! next time I'll 
choose bag a so ha ther e 
 
 12  B HAHHAHAAAA 
16  A  ho ho ho ho 
 
 12  B we could be here a while... 






Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
1  C  seems the fairest    4  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
15  A  let the war begin then ;-) 
 
 8  B 50e this way, that's only fai 
15  reject B   8     
 
Treatment 2 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 




Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
16  C  be fair?    6  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 
10  C  Equal chance for both of us -  are we really 
going to agree on  anything else? 
 2  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
8  C  If we choose this bag we both have an 
equal chance of picking a ball of our colour 
 1  B I"TS STUPID TO HAVE ANY RED BALLS 
IN  THERE. WE MIGHT NEITHER GET 
PAID 
8  A  Fair enough, I choose bag A then...    1  B Do B first. We can agree A in the  later 
rounds, and go on the  pingpong ball 
 
8  C  Neither of us wants a bag with 3 times as 
many different coloured balls than our own 
colour in. We must compromise. 
 1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
7  A  there are no red balls- one of us is  bound 
to win 
 
 5  C at least here we have equal chance with 
equal blue and yellow 
7  A  Sorry I prefer A 
 
 5  B well i prefer b 
7  C  Changed my mind!    5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
14  B  Do you agree?    4  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
13  A  i need one round with a high chance of 
winning some money 
 
 9  B Ok but now it`s my turn 
13  A  if you let me have one round where i have 
a good chance, in all other rounds i will do 
the same for other people 
 
 9  C We`ll never meet again. Let`s take an 
agreement, ok? 




Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
3  A  I want this bag. you cannot refuse me!    11  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 







Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
10  C  Equal chance for both of us -  and are we 
really going to agree on anything else? 
 16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
2  A  what do you think about this    6  C Look, I'm a fair guy.  I'm also very 
stubborn.  Be principled or I'll keep  
rejecting.  Fair? {{-] 
 
2  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
7  A  If you reject this we could lose it all    8  B Ditto... 
 
7  C  Compromise??   8  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
1  A  I'ts stupid to have a bag with any red balls 
in. We should pick this one, and then trade 
off in the later rounds 
 5  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
13  A  if i can have one round with a good chance 
of winning, you should be able to agree the 
same thing with somebody  else in a later 
round 
 
 14  C Let's have an even chance of winning 
13  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
9  A  I need a round with high chance, please! 
And your probability is 1/4 
 4  C I could do with one as well - but have 
chosen this as at least it  is fair! p=0.4 for 
each 








Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
12  A  I want to take something risky we are 4 
rounds 
 11  B Let's cooperate and in this way next roud 
somebody will help you whit an option like 
B. Everibody win! 
 
12  C  why you ask me to coperate if you dont if 
you dont coperate with me I think t he best 
is this easy option 
 11  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 








Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
16  C  C the fairway  disagree to disagree?    8  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
1  A  It's stupid to have any red balls in  there. 
We should agree this, and trade off in the 
last round. 
 6  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
10  C  Equal chance for both of us - and are we 
really going to agree on anything 14else? 
 7  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
2  C  it's more equal, isn't it?    5  reject C  
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
14  A     11  B Last round I coperate with my partner 
please this time coperate with me, in this 
way every body win something. 
14  accept B        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
4  A  i need a successful round.  have faile d he 
other 2 as the person would not  accept the 
fairest, so have gone for one better for me! 
 3  C Let's make a compromise. It's not the  
best of days for me as well. What do  you 
reckon? 
 
4  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 






Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 
15  C  this is the fairest bag - we  obviously wont 
agree on the other 2 - pick this one 





Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
14  A   
 
 16  C who ever wins, buy us a pint! 
14  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
6  C  I'm staying principled.  It's my best  offer.  
Also I think somebody's a computer. : -] 
 4  accept C 
            
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
10  C  Equal chance for both of us - and are we 
ever going to agree on  anything else? 
 13  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
9  A  I`ve just lost 2 rounds. Yellow has a first 
mover advantage in this game (it is 
structured in this way!). If we agree now is 
better for both 
 2  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
8  C  The only fair way to do things... If  you 
disagree we could both get nothing 
 11  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
1  C     3  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
12  C  Just reject if you have a better idea    7  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 
5  A  no reds which are a waste for us    15  C we wont agree on the other 2 -  reds are a 
fair price to pay for  equality ! 
 
5  accept C        
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Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
7  C  just to have equal chance    1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 
9  A  next you will be yellow, think!    5  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
10  C  Are you agree?    15  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
11  C  this gives us more chances to agree    12  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
1  A     4  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
8  A  This is gambling, consider it    3  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
13  A     16  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 






Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
5  A  If u reject, u don't win any money...    7  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
9  A  next round you will be yellow, think!    1  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
10  C  It's Ok bag C?    12  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 




Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
3  C  Obviously the friendliest option - what have 
you got to lose? I'm offering equal 
chances... 
 4  reject C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
8  B  I give your color more chances    2  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
14  A  I choose bag A again, agree?    16  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
7  A  if you reject,u won't win any money    10  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
15  C  50/50,unless red,a 1in9 chance forboth    1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
5  C  Fair?   12  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
11  C  Is fair for both of us    9  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
16  A  agree, or noone gets anything, sorry!    4  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
13  A     2  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
3  C  Equal chances... you're obviously not going 
to get a better offer, and if yo u reject, we'll 
most likely get nothing... 
 14  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
4  C  equal chance!    7  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
1  C  we will have equal chance. ***    2  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
3  C  equal chances... you're obviously not going 
to get a better offer, and if you reject, we'll 
most likely get nothing... 
 5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
8  C  Let's play it fair    9  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
10  A  If you rej you will not receive money    16  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
13  A     15  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
12  A  Prob. of Suc> Accept-2/8 Reject-15/160    14  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
13  C   
 
 8  B  
13  reject B        
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 
10  B  there is a large chance if we negotiat e that 
we will lose so i think we shou ld go with 
blue 
 2  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
14  A  You know it makes sense! 
 
 1  C This is much more sensible... I am a bit 
lucky that it landed on green tho aren't I?! 
 




Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
12  C  because there are equal yellow & blue so 
we'd have an equal chance 
 15  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
11  C  There is an even chance of either of us 
winning 
 4  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
3  C     6  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
9  C  please choose Bag C as we both  have 
equal chances of winning. The  risk of the 
spin being terminated  (85%) is too great. 
 5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 
16  C  I think we should pick this bag becaus it's 
fair, and it's the only way we're going to 
agree. 





Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
13  A     10  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
8  A     2  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
14  C  This is the best way for both of us to get 
money methinks! 
 15  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
1  C  Fair's fair!    12  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
3  C     11  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 







Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
9  C  Please choose Bag C since we have equa 
al chances of winning. The risk of a spin 
being terminated (85%) is too gre at. 
 16  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 
7  C  I think we should chose this one because it 
is fair 





Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
14  C  Equal chances (apart from red) so its  fair.  
have fun! 
 13  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
1  C  It's the right thing to do...    8  reject C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
15  C  hey this is just like that gameshow wi Nasty 
Nick off of Big Brother isn't it ? Go C Share 
the wealth!!! 
 10  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
2  A  've been blue the last two times so ha ve 
been unlucky - but its still better for you to 
accept than decline chance  wise... 
please... 
 12  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
9  C  Please choose bag C since we have equal 
chances of winning. The risk of  a spin 
being terminated (85%) is too  great 
 11  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
5  C  I think that this one is fair. Why not accept 
it (otherwise the game might be 
terminated-chances are not really in o ur 
favour-15%) 
 4  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
3  A  be kind    16  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
13  A  Final offer. I don't mind risk. it's A or 
nothing. Better to have a small  chance 
than no chance. 
 11  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
8  A     4  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
3  A  if you relect negotiations may fail  leading 
to you having no chance in this round, 
accept and it will at  least be 1 in 4 
 10    accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
2  A  I've been blue in all my previous  rounds 
and have had to accept the  worst deal, so 
please accept it -  give me a chance... its 
stil better to accept than decline 
 
 6  C hi, how about bag c 
2  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
9  A  probability that spin is green is 15% 
probability that you will win on bag A is 
25%. You have better odds by agreeing. 
 14  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
5  C  I think that this one is fair. Why not accept 
it (the odds are against us aft er all, 85% 
risk of termination) ? 
 1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
16  C  I think we should choose this bag  because 
it makes it fair between us. 
 15  reject C 
 
 
Treatment 3 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 
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Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
9  A  looks promising    2  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 
1  C  tHIS GIVES US BOTH THE FAIREST 
CHANCE 
 3  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
16  A  go on, makes sense    15  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
12  A  Is bag a ok by you    7  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
5  A  I think this is the best chance we get    10   reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
6  A  The prob is higher for me    11  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
8  A  4y 2b- acceptable?    14  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
2  A  if it's rejected then we both lose out    3  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
1  A  FROMS A STRATEGY FOR THE FOUR 
SECTIONS 
 9  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
12  A  Is bag a ok by you?    15  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
7  A  Is bag a ok with you?    16  accept A 
  
54
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
11  A  If you reject then you have very littl chance, 
by accepting it is still possi ble to win 
 10  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
6  A  The prob is higher for me    5  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
13  C  This make the most sense for both of o us: 
we both have equal chance 
 14  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 






Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
15  A  A?   2  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
16  A  go on, say ok. if i win, my round    9  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
3  C  it is fair choice    12  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
1  A  IS QUITE STRATEGIC    7  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
10  C  Hi! We both have 2 out of 5 chances of 
winning, despite the red balls. With  the 
other bags it's only 1 out of 4  for the 
"second" higher  chance. 
 14  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
5  C  It is fair for both of us..    8  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
11  A  By rejecting you have a 85% chance of  
nothing, and even if i can remake the  
decision ill still go for A. Accepting still 
gives you the only  chance 






Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
10  C  Both have equal chances (2/5) with C.  
Otherwise, it's 3/4 for one but only  1/4 for 
the other! 
 2  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
9  C  Let's reach an agreement. same risk. same 
pay, what do you think? 
 5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
3  C  it gives fair chance    11  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
1  A     6  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
15  A  A?   14  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
16  A  your best statistical chance is accept    8  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
13  A  By going with Bag A you have a 25% cha 
nce of winning. By going with the wheel 
oyu have an 85% chance of losing. I  will 
always choose bag A no  matter what. This 
is your be 
 12  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 1 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 






Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 1 
1  B  How about more yellow, to make it equal?    8  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 2 




Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 3 
12  C  we've both got a better chance this  way    11  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 4 
5  A     16  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 5 
6  B  Most blues it has to be this.    13  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 6 
10  C  This gives us both a fair chance  of winning 
something 
 9  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 7 
7  A  pick bag a 
 
 2  C This is the safest bet, we both have a n 
equal chance of winning, so i sugges t 
that u pick bag c 
 
7  accept C        
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 1 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 1 
14  C  don't you think we should maximise our 
chances of winning some money  and 
always choose bag c? 
 8  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 2 
1  A     4  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 3 
12  C  We've got a better chance with this option    5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 4 
11  A  You have more of a chance with bag A 
then if it is rejected... 
 16  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 5 
10  C  We both stand a better chance of winning 
some money this way 





Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 6 
9  A  I know it doesn't sound fair but if you reject 
and the round is  terminated (with 85% 
probability), th en we both receive 0. this 
way you stand a chance 
 13  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 7 
2  C  This is the safest bet for both of us, if u 
agree then we both have an equal  chance 
of winning, if not the chance o f you getting 
to spin the wh eel and getting another go i 
 15  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 2 
 
Pair 8 






Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 1 
12  A  Sorry about this but this way we've  got a 
one in four chance the other way its only 
15 from a 100 
 8  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 2 
11  A  You have a better chance with Bag A then 
if it is rejected.... 
 1  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 3 
14  C  I trust you! 
 
 5  A  
14  reject A        
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 4 
4  A  hey - if you reject this, then none of win, 
but if you just say yes to this  at least we 
will both have a chance 
 16  reject A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 5 
6  B  Get as many blues in the bag as poss.    2  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 6 
13  C  better chance for us both    7  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 7 
10  C  With this bag we both have a fair chance of 
winning 





Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 3 
 
Pair 8 





Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 1 
6  B  Get as many blues in the bag as poss.    8  accept B 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 2 
13  C     1  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 3 
14  A     10  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 4 
4  C  come on - say yes to this, we have an  
equal chance 
 9  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 5 
12  C  go on please    2  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 6 
11  A  You'll have a better chance with bag A then 
if you reject and get nothing.. 
 7  accept A 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 7 
15  C  This is Macc Ladd pick bag c    5  accept C 
 
 
Treatment 4 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 8 






                                                           
1 This has to be distinguished from individual rationality. If agreement (and thus the 
avoidance of z) requires unanimous individual assent, then each partner assenting to C is a 
Nash strategic equilibrium, even with five or more red balls. 
2  Actually the Nash theory does not require that individual utilities are vNM, in the sense of 
representing preferences under uncertainty, but only that they have (at least) the same degree 
of cardinality as vNM. In the present context, however, vNM is a natural interpretation. 
3  The seminal reference is Nash (1950). An exposition of the Nash theory can be found in 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, ch.2). 
4 For an individual we would expect the eligible subset not to depend on d, i.e., on the default 
outcome in the event of failure to choose. However in any well-defined individual choice 
problem there must always be such a default, even if only tacitly specified. 
5  Camerer (1995) provides an excellent survey. 
6 Two key references are Roth and Malouf (1979) and Roth and Murnighan (1982). For full 
references and an overview, see pp. 40-49 of Roth (1995a) 
7 There is a large body of experimental work on the Ultimatum Game, the evidence from 
which suggests that proposers frequently do not take full advantage of their strategic position. 
An early reference is Guth et al (1982). Roth (1995b) provides a survey and discussion.  
8 Note the significance here of the condition  ˆ γ<π, which in the Nash theory precludes 
agreement on Bag C. Given this condition, there is no value of θ for which agreement on C is 
the unique strategic equilibrium, whereas there are values of θ for which the equilibria 
include agreement on A or B but not on C. For a discussion of the relationship between the 
axiomatic (Nash) and strategic theories of bargaining see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, ch4) 
9  A full record of the agreements and negotiations is available in Appendix C.  
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